

JPRS 76739

31 October 1980

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1076

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

31 October 1980

USSR REPORT

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

No. 1076

CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL

Critique of U.S., Chinese Apologists for Arms Race (N. I. Lebedev, S. V. Kortunov; NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA, Jul-Aug 80)	1
U.S., PRC Encourage Militarization of Japan (Andrei Beteshkin; NOVOSTI DAILY REVIEW, 4 Oct 80)	28
Tajiks in Soviet-Austrian Exchanges (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 26 Aug 80)	32
Afghan Journalists Visit Tajikistan (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 23 Aug 80)	35
Tajik Public Health Group in Afghanistan (Yu. B. Iskhaki Interview; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 6 Jul 80)	36
Bankruptcy of Maoist Ideology Exposed (Igor Sinitsin; NOVOSTI DAILY REVIEW, 4 Oct 80) ...	38

REGIONAL

Role of Local Soviets in Economic Development Stressed (L. Yerminev; PRAVDA, 18 Sep 80)	41
Turkmen MVD Official on Firearms Registration Violations (TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 27 Aug 80)	46
Soviet Scholars Research Polish-Speaking Minority in Border Areas (NASHE SLOVO, 5 Oct 80)	48

- a -

[III - USSR - 35]

INTERNATIONAL

CRITIQUE OF U. S., CHINESE APOLOGISTS FOR ARMS RACE

Moscow NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORIYA in Russian No 4, Jul-Aug 80 signed to press 26 Jun 80 pp 3-22

[Article by N. I. Lebedev and S. V. Kortunov: "The Problem of Disarmament and the Ideological Struggle — Critique of the Apologists for the Arms Race"]

[Text] The Soviet Union, the other countries of the socialist community, and all peace-loving forces constantly and persistently present constructive proposals for cessation of the arms race, disarmament, and insuring security, which would be based on political cooperation and bolstering trust in relations among states. With a realistic assessment of the devastating consequences of world thermonuclear conflict, the most sober-minded representatives of the ruling circles of various capitalist countries are gradually coming to understand that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence by states belonging to different social systems.

An important milepost in the development of the positive processes occurring in the contemporary world community was completion of the second phase of negotiations on limitation of strategic offensive weapons and the signing of the SALT-II Treaty in June 1979. This treaty not only creates an effective system of measures to limit and reduce strategic weapons, but also offers prospects for reaching a new agreement.

The peace initiatives and proposals formulated by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev in his talk at the anniversary meeting devoted to the 30th anniversary of the formation of the German Democratic Republic are a significant contribution by the Soviet Union to the cause of stopping the arms race and achieving disarmament.

In his Berlin speech L. I. Brezhnev solemnly declared that the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against countries that refuse to produce and buy them and do not have them in their territory. He stated

that the Soviet Union is ready to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons in the western regions of the USSR today if NATO does not carry out its planned deployment of new medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

Guided by a sincere desire to finally bring the Vienna talks out of their stalemate, the Soviet Union, in agreement with the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, adopted a decision to unilaterally reduce the number of its forces in Central Europe and withdraw up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks, and a certain amount of other military equipment from East Germany. The peoples of many different countries greeted these initiatives, which are exceptionally important for strengthening peace and security in Europe and throughout the world, with enthusiasm and hope.¹

The struggle of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community for international detente, to reduce the levels of the military standoff between the NATO countries and the defensive Warsaw Pact, and for disarmament has recently, however, run up against a powerful counteroffensive by the most aggressive, militaristic circles of imperialist reaction. The decision of the NATO Council to deploy new medium-range American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the implementation of long-range programs of the North Atlantic bloc to modernize and build up their armed forces and armaments, the formation of the 100,000-strong "rapid response corps" in the United States, and the new five-year military program developed by the administration in Washington are all evidence that international imperialism is setting off a new, unprecedented in scope, round of the arms race. "It has already been clear for some time," L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his responses to questions by a correspondent of the newspaper PRAVDA, "that the leading figures of the United States and certain other NATO countries have adopted a line hostile to the cause of detente, a line of stepping up the arms race, which intensifies the danger of war."²

In an attempt to give an ideological substantiation for the acceleration of military preparations, imperialist propaganda has recently launched various pseudoscientific notions with which it tries to instill the idea that militarism is "foreordained," "inevitable," and supposedly "useful" and that any steps toward disarmament are "pointless" and even "harmful." The problem of disarmament thus becomes a sphere of bitter ideological struggle.

The propaganda barrage of militaristic ideas launched by the reactionary Western and Chinese press in the late 1970's and linked above all with the development of a series of new military problems in the United States and the other NATO countries, makes it particularly pressing to expose their bankruptcy and the enormous harm which they do to the cause of peace and international detente. Soviet historical science has the important challenge of "taking apart all those sophistries which

are used today to justify war, and to do so in the greatest detail," because these sophistries are "the principal means of involving the masses of common people in war."³

1

The chief argument of the apologists for the arms race is their allegation of a supposed "Soviet military threat." "This theme," as L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out, "is used when it is necessary to put through a higher military budget and curtail expenditures for social needs, when new types of deadly weapons are being developed, and when they are trying to justify the military activism of NATO."⁴

The myth of the "Soviet threat," which was formulated by anticommunists as early as 1917, began to be propagated with special intensity in the West by the enemies of the process of international detente at exactly the time when the world had come face to face with the problem of disarmament. The point is that the process of political detente exercised a profound influence on the mood of public opinion, led to the growth of optimistic expectations, and forced political figures in the West to resort to negotiations with the Soviet Union and normalization of the international situation and controlling the arms race. Evidence of this is the book "Can America Win the Next War?" by NEW YORK TIMES military observer D. Middleton. In the book the author shows his distress that the desire of people to believe in detente with the Soviet Union and the improvement in Soviet-American relations have engendered complacency in broad layers of American society.⁵

Thus, it is not a supposed "Soviet threat," but rather a change in the political climate in the Western countries and the undermining of the position of those circles that do not want to develop political detente and supplement it with military detente which explain the growing activism of the supporters of a return to the "cold war." This is why the NATO politicians and military figures cry out about the "Soviet military threat" and vow to reject any steps toward a reduction in arms. In the recently published book "No Soft Options," English Admiral P. Hill-Norton, referring to the "constant threat from the East," calls for one response: politics from a "position of strength" and building up the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc.⁶ The supporters of the arms race also use references to the "Soviet military threat" to substantiate the new five-year program of substantial build-up of armed forces and armaments adopted by J. Carter and the decision of the NATO Council to deploy new medium-range American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. In the latter case propagandists are using the so-called theory of "two equilibriums." The essential point of the theory is the statement that while on the global level, in the area of intercontinental strategic weapons, parity has developed between the USSR and the United States, on the European continent, in the area of medium-range stationary nuclear weapons, the "balance" is supposedly in favor of the Soviet Union. But with the deployment of Pershing-2 missiles and cruise

missiles in Western Europe, according to the heralds of the policy of building up arms, the American "nuclear guarantee" will be strengthened, the desired balance will be restored, and Europe will be able to counter the "military threat from the East." The American "hawks," campaigning vigorously against ratification of the SALT-II treaty, argue along the same lines. In their opinion, the treaty "perpetuates U. S. weakness" and enlarges the "Soviet threat." They try to represent the treaty as a kind of inordinate "concession" to the USSR, which would supposedly allow it to achieve "military superiority over the United States" in the future. The statements of the "hawks" are filled with terrifying predictions concerning the "unrestrained growth of the threat from the East" which will ensue if SALT-II goes into force.⁷

The adherents of the myth of the "Soviet threat" usually employ various types of fabrications that distort the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the defensive measures which our country is forced to take given the arms race that is stirred up by the imperialist countries. Some of them give information that is so distorted that, as G. Kennan, the American scholar who was a prominent diplomat in the past, has correctly observed, "One cannot help being surprised that such statements should come from responsible circles."⁸

This refers above all to the biased selection of numerical data on the supposedly "unrestrained growth" of military expenditures in the USSR. For example, American General A. Haig, former commander in chief of NATO Unified Armed Forces in Europe, states categorically that the Soviet Union "steadily increased its military spending 3-5 percent a year" through the 1970's. At the present time, the general says for purposes of intimidation, the world is witnessing "unprecedented growth in Soviet military potential."⁹ J. Ericson, a professor at Edinburgh University, states that the USSR "spends roughly 50 percent more than the United States for military needs."¹⁰

If we look at official statistics, however, the falsification of the true situation by Western propaganda becomes obvious. Beginning in 1970 the Soviet Union has systematically reduced military appropriations. Thus, in 1970 military spending was 17.8 billion rubles, whereas for the state budget recently ratified by the USSR Supreme Soviet it will be 17.1 billion rubles in 1980.¹¹ During this time the share of military spending in the budget of the USSR has dropped from 11.5 to six percent. The advantages of the socialist economic system allow the Soviet Union to have high defense capacity and maintain armed forces at the necessary level with relatively lower military spending than in the capitalist countries.

While raising a provocative hullabaloo about the "unrestrained growth of Soviet military spending" NATO propaganda constantly refers to the United States as "lagging behind" the USSR in this or that particular area of armed forces and arms.¹² They always resort to this technique when it is necessary to unfold the latest program of armaments, new

weapons systems, and new types of weapons and spur on the arms race. Thus they once organized a sensational campaign concerning the "United States' dangerous lag in bomber aviation." As a result the military monopolies received capital to carry out a program to develop heavy American bombers, first the B-47 and then the B-52 intercontinental bomber armed with strategic nuclear weapons. But just a few years later it was frankly admitted that "the bomber lag was a myth."¹³ A similar operation was carried out later under the pretext of an American "lag in missiles." Again it was demanded that the military budget be increased by many billions of dollars.

In the 1960's the American "hawks" launched a new version with the claim that the Soviet Union was carrying out a vast program of measures in the civil defense field which would supposedly inspire it to deliver a first strike against the United States and that various missile defense systems had been deployed around Moscow which would make a retaliatory strike by the United States ineffective "in case of an attack by the USSR." And although this fabrication was refuted by American politicians themselves, it was nonetheless the decisive factor in supporting the decision to develop the new MIRV missile system in the United States.¹⁴

The proposition that the Western countries are "swiftly falling behind" has been exploited with special intensity recently in connection with NATO's desire to undertake a new round of the arms race. In the West today it is being said that the Soviet Union has "superiority" over the United States in both strategic forces and nonnuclear weapons. It is alleged, for example, that the Soviet Union has an advantage in number of missiles and in their potential, that the Soviet ground forces outnumber the Americans three-to-one and have many more tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery guns, and that the Soviet Union is producing more tactical airplanes and helicopters and has overtaken the United States in the construction of surface ships and submarines.¹⁵

The purpose of these statements is clear. As G. Kennan observes, they are used to push enormous military budgets through Congress and to get ratification of various new arms programs such as the program for the MX mobile ballistic missile, the new B-1 strategic bomber, the Trident submarine, the cruise missile, the XM-1 tank, and others.¹⁶ The entire history of the Soviet Union shows that it has never threatened anyone and has never attacked anyone. When the Soviet Republic was formed on 7 November 1917, it had no armed forces of its own. The Tsarist Army was in disarray at that time, and the Red Army began to be formed only after counterrevolutionary bands and foreign interventionists armed to the teeth reached the gates of Petrograd. For several years the Red Army was forced to repel the attacks of the unified forces of the interventionists.

Scarcely more than 20 years had passed since the end of World War I when fascist Germany, the main striking force of international

imperialism, attacked the Soviet Union. In 1949 the United States and ruling circles in the Western European countries, taking advantage of the "cold war" they had unleashed and building up war psychosis, formed the aggressive NATO military alliance, directed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Only six years later, when attempts to form an all-European security system had failed through the fault of the Western powers, did the socialist countries join together in the defensive Warsaw Pact Organization.

Other facts are also well known. According to the figures of the American Brookings Institute, the United States and the other NATO countries used their armed forces for political and military purposes 215 times between 1946 and 1975.¹⁷ On some occasions these actions led to protracted and bloody wars. The states of the Warsaw Pact did not wage one day of war. During this time the United States put its nuclear forces in a state of full combat readiness 33 times and at least 19 times directly or indirectly threatened the socialist countries with nuclear weapons. During these same years the Soviet Union introduced roughly 60 proposals relating to the issues of peace and international security. It is the United States, not the USSR, which has attempted throughout the postwar period to develop the "ultimate weapon," with which the imperialists had hoped to achieve military superiority over the socialist countries and impose their will on them.

Therefore, the true source of the constant threat of war is the United States. As for the fabrications of bourgeois propaganda concerning the "Soviet threat," as L. I. Brezhnev emphasized, this is a "monstrous lie from start to finish."¹⁸ "We must not frighten ourselves with fabricated threats, but rather discuss the problems and potential that now exist in a business-like, constructive manner."¹⁹

The enemies of peace and detente are now trying to take advantage of the events in Afghanistan, depicting the aid given by the Soviet Union to this country in repulsing imperialist aggression from abroad as a "threat to peace." Using these events as a pretext, the U. S. Government has taken a number of steps to intensify the arms race, including the nuclear arms race. The White House has indefinitely postponed consideration of the issue of ratification of the SALT-II treaty by the U. S. Senate. A decision has been made to form what are called "rapid response forces"; this represents preparation for aggressive, interventionist actions in various parts of the globe.

Needless to say, the Soviet Union is not carrying on any kind of "intervention" or "aggression" in Afghanistan. At the request of the Government of Afghanistan and in conformity with a Soviet-Afghan treaty and Article 51 of the U. N. Charter, the USSR is helping this country defend its liberty and independence against aggressive actions by American imperialism and the Beijing hegemonists. The events in Afghanistan are not the true cause of the current aggravation of the international situation. If there were no Afghanistan, militaristic

circles in the United States and NATO would certainly find another pretext to aggravate the world situation and give the arms race new impetus.

The administration of President J. Carter, as THE NEW YORK TIMES observed, is now rounding out a change in U. S. foreign policy whose outlines have been discernible for some time. It is following a policy of refusing to negotiate on arms limitations. Carter ordered the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to cease its efforts to "turn swords into plowshares" and instructed that everyone involved with arms control issues postpone all initiatives in this field.²¹

It is common knowledge that long before the events in Afghanistan the White House had in fact become opposed to conducting negotiations in the field of arms limitation, and for this reason the negotiations produced no results and Washington essentially torpedoed some of them, in particular negotiations concerned with the Indian Ocean.

L. I. Brezhnev described the actions of the American administration in connection with the events in Afghanistan as a poorly thought-out attempt to take advantage of these events to block international efforts to reduce the danger of war, strength and peace, and limit the arms race. "The unilateral steps taken by the United States represent serious policy mistakes. Like a boomerang, tomorrow if not today, they will return to strike those who launched them."²¹

2

The conception of preserving peace on the basis of "equilibrium of fear" or "balance of terror" occupies an important place in the arsenal of the enemies of disarmament. In the logic of those who preach it, peace and security can only be gained if potential enemies are mutually deterred by the threat of self-extermination. According to the reactionary West German scholar K. Menert, wars have not occurred between the two opposed blocs not because the human race is peace-minded, but rather because the thought of the consequences of such wars terrifies everyone who could unleash them and overcomes their readiness to press the buttons and pull the levers. It will continue this way as long as the "equilibrium of fear" lasts.²² Z. Brzezinski, national security advisor to the U. S. President, holds similar views. "The existence of weapons of total devastation," he wrote, "makes the consequences of a conflict incalculable and thus reduces the probability of a major war."²³

Accepting this proposition as an axiom, bourgeois ideologists draw the conclusion that it is necessary not only to perpetuate the "balance of terror" because, they think, any attempt to disturb it by disarmament would probably lead to war, but also to continuously build up military might at both poles. The accumulation of weapons, they say, plays a supposedly positive, stabilizing role because it provides a more and more "reliable" guarantee that these weapons will never be used in practice.

When the issue is formulated in that way, the arms race changes from bad to good; it acquires the role of guaranteeing preservation of the peace.

The supporters of the conception of the "balance of terror" try to depict themselves as peace-loving, although their writings are directed at undermining detente and expected to substantiate continuation of the arms race in the interests of the military-industrial complex.

The bourgeois ideologists and politicians say that the "equilibrium of fear" has been a main reason for international detente. If the world wants to continue detente, they argue, it is necessary to strengthen the "equilibrium of fear," the "mutual deterrence." West German author Von Raven writes: "Deterrence is not the opposite of detente, but rather its prerequisite. If in the striving for detente deterrence is rejected, this will only harm detente."²⁴ The same idea was expressed by West German political scientist H. Andren, who warned against steps toward reducing arms. Detente between the superpowers, he declares, is the "child of nuclear weapons and the balance of terror...and history has not yet answered whether it is necessary for the parents to be kept alive if the child is to survive."²⁵ In other words, there is no need to travel the path of disarmament for the sake of preserving and developing detente.

Ruling circles in the United States and the other NATO countries believe that the arms race is compatible with detente. Moreover, they think that only by building up strength will it be possible to follow a policy of co-existence with the socialist countries. "Those who say that America is over-armed and spends too much for defense," said former President of the United States G. Ford, "are deeply confused. Detente and national defense are interrelated."²⁶ In August 1975, having restated his desire to develop detente, he persistently called for building up U. S. military strength: "I will oppose any reductions in the military budget as firmly as I can, with all the means at my disposal."²⁷ "A strong defense," in his opinion, "is the most reliable path to peace. Strength makes detente feasible."²⁸ This approach has been inherited by the Carter Administration; U. S. military spending rose sharply in the late 1970's. "Constant American might," he said, "is the only possible foundation for the broader, truly mutual international detente which we are seeking in relations with the Soviet Union."²⁹

What can be said about the essence of the idea of peace based on the "equilibrium of fear"? There is only one possible answer: peace cannot rest on the irrational foundation of mutual nuclear deterrence. Balancing on the brink of an all-devastating war has, by itself, the most devastating consequences for the moral atmosphere throughout the world and for human ethical values. "Fear of a nuclear war," the prominent English scholar D. Bernal wrote, "is an intolerable situation which is already having extremely serious social and psychological

consequences. Nothing has any value, nothing has the slightest meaning if everything can be swept away by nuclear war."³⁰

But the chief flaw of "nuclear peace" is not so much the dangerous psychological atmosphere that it creates as it is the fact that it does not actually give any realistic guarantees of preventing another world war. The supporters of the idea of "mutual deterrence" propose that we put our trust in a belief that, faced with the threat of mutual extermination, potential enemies will show restraint.

Historical experience shows, however, that it is not enough to rely just on common sense and weighing events from the standpoint of formal logic when international problems, especially problems of war and peace, are being decided. Some time ago the famous German military theoretician K. Clausewitz remarked that war and the preparations associated with it are based on "a game of possibilities and probabilities, happiness and unhappiness, among which the sequence of strict logical reasoning frequently disappears; logic in general proves helpless and a useless mental tool."³¹ It is true that the most flawless logical arguments have led to mistakes. Let us look at historical examples. More than 100 years ago Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, stated that he saw a "great hope for peace" in the new weapon.³² In his opinion, the consequences of using dynamite would be so terrifying that the very idea of them would logically drive politicians to conclude that war was impossible. But what happened? Did wars stop for this reason? Did peace become stronger? Of course, it did not. The discovery of dynamite, like the discovery of the machine gun, the tank, the airplane, and poison gases, not only failed to put an end to war, but on the contrary made them even more destructive.

It is widely known that just before World War I, in November 1912, W. Churchill said: "The world will say that a generation which permitted such a war to occur was a generation of madmen." On the other side of the English Channel at the same time French Prime Minister R. Poincare was also saying, "A war occurring now would be a challenge thrown down to common sense, the human race, civilization."³³ Nonetheless, two years later the imperialist powers thrust the world into an insane catastrophe, and among the organizers were W. Churchill and R. Poincare.

As long as capitalism exists, there also exists a source of military danger and the threat of war cannot be completely eliminated. The history of the world has confirmed this statement many times. Therefore, the lofty talk of bourgeois ideologists to the effect that the appearance of extraordinarily destructive weapons can by itself eliminate global warfare is inflammatory.

Arguments that the arms race plays a "peacemaking" role are equally bankrupt. The American author P. Crosser, speaking of the consequences of the arms race, writes: "A situation may be created where

both nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, will be looking at one another down the barrels of their guns. There will not be much choice: either wait in fear of a first strike by the enemy, or press the button in terror, thus initiating a powerful nuclear attack. Under these conditions, the danger that one of the opponents will deliver a preemptive strike steadily increases."¹⁴

Thus, the "nuclear peace" based on systematic reproduction of the "equilibrium of fear" at an ever-higher level and on the unrestrained arms race cannot be in the interests of the human race. As L. I. Brezhnev has emphasized, this kind of peace does not suit any of us. It would differ little from "cold war." "This would be a 'cold war' which could easily evolve into a tense confrontation that oppresses the consciousness and life of the world's peoples and is fraught with danger of worldwide conflicts. People want a reliable and irreversible peace based, if it may be put this way, on a balance of security and mutual trust. This is a peace that is open to broad international cooperation in the name of progress."¹⁵

3

While the advocates of the conception of the "equilibrium of fear," attempting to justify the continuing arms race, manipulate military and political categories, a different group of apologists for militarism uses economic categories for this purpose. We refer here to the so-called theory of military commodity fetishism, whose authors try to demonstrate the favorable effect of military spending on the capitalist economy.

Even before and during World War I various bourgeois economists (German professor R. Heniger, D. Hobson, and others) sang the praises of war and militarism as means of creating an excellent market for all sectors of the capitalist economy. They tried to prove that from a national economic point of view military spending was productive. Criticizing these pseudoscientific views, V. I. Lenin called them the prattle of a "fool devoted to militarism who proves that spending for the army is not lost at all, because the money remains in the country and produces enormous profits."¹⁶ Experience has confirmed the correctness of Lenin's statements many times.

Nonetheless, even today an enormous amount of literature continues to be published in the West attempting to prove the "stabilizing role" of military spending in the economy, the "secondary impact" from the growth of investment in military industry, and the "full employment" which intensified militarization supposedly can cause. "War is a terrible thing," the American economist C. Ayres wrote. "But at the same time, it is the principal factor in prosperity."¹⁷ Other American authors call military spending the "cornerstone" for regulating demand through the state sector.¹⁸

The mechanism of this regulation has been described by the American economists C. Hitch and R. Mackin in their book "The Military Economy in the Nuclear Age." They believe that military spending not only "diminishes the likelihood of a decline in general demand," but also "promotes the taking of other anti-inflationary measures," for example the "injection" of additional money into the economy. "The military program," they state, "acts as a kind of circuit breaker against crises."³⁹

In recent years a whole school of Western political scientists had appeared which "blesses" the rapid obsolescence of arms because it supposedly promotes the "exceptionally humane function of the user of military output" which "would otherwise have to be performed by war." Pricing the "beneficial impact" of obsolescence, Lockheed vice president L. Ridenour states: "We discard our automobiles long before they stop running, and our economy would crumble if we did not do so. Our missile program performs a similar function brilliantly. We send up missiles and they never return, so therefore we are constantly building new missiles. This is wonderful! This creates jobs and insures monetary circulation."⁴⁰

A fairly large group of apologists for militarism argue from the viewpoint of military commodity fetishism. In their attempt to substantiate the supposedly favorable impact of the arms race on the economy, the bourgeois thinkers are trying to convince the working people that it is economically advantageous and thus to justify the increase in military spending to them. The advocates of continuation of the arms race made extensive use of the economic crisis of 1974-1975, frightening public opinion with the specter of unemployment and a drop in the standard of living to oppose any steps toward reducing arms. In early 1975 the journal NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS claimed that "many workers will lose their jobs" as the result of a small reduction in armed forces announced by the Labor Government.⁴¹

For all their absurdity, such views have a certain influence on certain strata in the Western countries. Nor is this surprising, because the prospect of being without a job is the most terrifying threat for working people in a capitalist society. Massive ideological conditioning and the fear of unemployment and inflation often lead to a situation where some workers and employees at military enterprises demonstrate a concern for maintaining a high level of military spending and support continuation of the arms race.⁴²

But what is the real effect of militarization of an economy on the development of productive forces? Is an increase in armament really a panacea against crises and inflationary processes? Does an increase in military spending in fact lead automatically to solving the problem of unemployment?

The history of the postwar decades has shown that militarism has economic repercussions that cancel out the temporary effect of "revitalization" of the market situation. While it stimulates an overall growth

in production for a short time, the arms race ultimately has a negative effect on capitalist reproduction, undermining its foundation, and slows down the development of the overall economic potential of the particular country.

This is graphically demonstrated by a comparison of the rates of growth of industrial production of militaristic countries with those having smaller military budgets, in particular a comparison between the United States and Japan. In the three postwar decades U. S. military spending has been 11-12 percent of gross social product. During this same time in Japan the figure was roughly one percent. The average annual growth rate of industrial production in the United States for 1956-1975 was less than one-third of the rate in Japan.⁴³ The U. S. share of industrial production in the capitalist countries dropped from 34.6 to 39.2 percent in the period 1948-1974 while Japan's share increased from 1.2 to 9.2 percent.⁴⁴ And although militarism itself is not the only cause of this situation, it has nonetheless played an important part.

The example of West Germany is instructive. Its economy developed rapidly in the 1950's and early 1960's, that is, when military spending was still fairly low. It was in these years that the rate of economic growth in West Germany rose, and this made it possible for the country to overtake its capitalist partners for many indicators. However, as military spending increased the economic growth rate of West Germany slowed down.

Thus, life itself refutes military commodity fetishism. Military spending has not become the determining factor in economic growth in any Western country. On the contrary, higher rates of economic development have generally been observed in those capitalist countries where military spending was comparatively low. Even bourgeois specialists have been reaching this conclusion recently. For example, American professor C. Bowdoin emphasizes that "the U. S. Department of Defense is causing great economic harm to the country. It is reducing domestic consumption by roughly 13 percent and decreasing the rate of economic growth, probably, by two percent a year."⁴⁵

The history of the postwar decades has also demonstrated the bankruptcy of statements by bourgeois ideologists to the effect that the arms race has been a means of averting crises. Of course, it cannot be denied that the military-economic preparations of the imperialist countries, which have reached enormous scale, have a certain impact on the course of capitalist reproduction. By regulating military orders the bourgeois state is able to postpone somewhat the beginning of a crisis or mitigate its development. But overall military spending cannot change the cyclical character of capitalist reproduction. Evidence of this is the economic crises which have occurred in the capitalist countries since the war, in particular the most severe and profound world economic crisis of 1974-1975.

Enormous military expenditures intensify currency-financial difficulties. The arms race and inflation are inseparable. Because of paper money emission to cover the state debt, the channels of circulation are overflowing with money, which leads to inflationary processes. As statistics show, in the first years after the war the growth rate of gross national product in the United States corresponded almost exactly to the rate of growth of money in circulation. But under conditions of the arms race of the 1960's and the war in Vietnam, the rate of increase in GNP was less than half that of monetary emissions.⁴⁶ "In our country," said American Senator Tydings, "military spending has undermined economic development, doubled the rate of inflation, and led to an unprecedented peacetime budget deficit."⁴⁷ In 1978 the debt of the U. S. federal government reached the astronomical figure of 786 billion dollars.⁴⁸

The arms race has not brought the "absolute employment" promised by bourgeois economists or the "general prosperity and well-being." In 1974-1975 unemployment in the developed capitalist countries grew sharply, reaching a scale unprecedented in the last 40 years. The total number of completely unemployed persons in these countries reached more than 18 million in the fall of 1975.⁴⁹ Unemployment was particularly extensive in the United States. G. Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, observed that the highest level of unemployment occurred in the "cities and states where military industry is predominant."⁵⁰

Thus, the arms race is not ridding the capitalist countries of crises, unemployment, or other chronic problems. Moreover, it intensifies economic difficulties and retards the development of productive forces. Many works by bourgeois authors in the 1970's have emphasized the "factor of instability" created in the capitalist economy by high military budgets.⁵¹ Such prominent American thinkers as J. Galbraith, A. Burns, E. Mansfield, S. Melman, and G. Kolko have begun criticizing the policy of continuing to increase military spending. In his book "The Supersoldiers," D. Kanan writes that the U. S. administration figured to stimulate the economy by military spending and help overcome the recession, but these plans were cancelled out by inflation.⁵²

Another American thinker S. Melman, in a book with the striking title "The Permanent War Economy. American Capitalism in Decline," wrote that militarization of the U. S. economy has turned out to be the opposite of what was expected: instead of a means of solving the problem of surplus capital and labor it has become a generator of surplus capital and labor, which finally led to growth in unemployment, an increase in the export of capital to foreign countries and a rise in prices within the country.⁵³ American historian G. Kolko holds similar opinions. "These surrogates," he writes, referring to militarization of the economy and the arms race, "are essential to maintain capitalism, but with the passage of time they have become increasingly dangerous,

first for the rest of the world, then for the American people also, and finally for the well-being and vitality of capitalism in the United States itself."⁵⁴

4

We must consider one other way that the enemies of disarmament try to stop or slow down military detente. We are referring to taking advantage of the military-technical difficulties of restricting arms. Some Western specialists, referring to the asymmetry that exists in the military arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, conclude that it is impossible to compare the armaments of the opposing sides and, therefore, a balanced reduction in their military potential is also impossible.

In a recently published book D. Collins and A. Cordeman, specialist in strategic studies, write that a comprehensive comparison of military might is always no more than an approximation because there is no generally accepted "formula for comparison and compensation." Therefore, they state, strategic comparisons are not much use.⁵⁵ A comparison would only be possible in action, but even then it proves very crude because not even the most sophisticated games at the Pentagon allow a realistic reproduction of sufficiently large-scale simultaneous actions by ground forces and aviation with due regard for the principal differences in the tactics and structures of armed forces between particular NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.⁵⁶

Collins elaborates the idea of disproportions in armaments and armed forces in another book, "American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Crisis."⁵⁷ American Senator G. McGovern, and English Admiral Hill-Norton also referred to the asymmetry in military arsenals as a supposed "obstacle to disarmament." Hill-Norton, for example, believes that only particular elements of the military balance today are subject to quantitative accounting and an attempt to compare the military arsenals of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as a whole is doomed to fail.⁵⁸

The English researcher R. Haas, an associate of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, goes even further. He believes that in the age of scientific-technical revolution a quantitative comparison of armed forces and armaments, especially in the field of naval weapons, is completely impossible. It is unclear, he writes, whether disarmament talks should consider simply the total number of warships or must take account of the ability of the sides to send "nonnaval forces and systems" to the given region and whether the task of control should be to limit naval forces as a whole, naval forces in a particular region, or whether they should be evaluated by the contribution which they could make to the development of events in a broader military theater. It is his opinion that none of the traditional criteria such as total number, tonnage, or equipment can provide a complete and accurate picture.⁶⁰

Whether desired or not, the dissemination of such ideas sows skepticism and lack of faith in the possibility of progress toward disarmament and objectively obstructs solving this vitally important problem. In reality, however, these ideas serve as a pretext for all kinds of delays in disarmament talks and make it difficult to reach concrete agreement. The West has often used the objective difficulties of comparing different forms of weapons for unjustifiably dragging out talks on limiting armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. American diplomacy has functioned in the same way during preparation of the SALT-II agreement.

There is no question that difficulties exist in comparing the military potential of the opposing parties, and they are significant difficulties. They arise from the revolution in science and technology occurring in our day, the greatest such revolution in human history. It leads to increasing complexity in all models of weapons and to rapid obsolescence. The scientific-technical revolution, which cannot develop in the same way in different countries, generates asymmetry in the military arsenals of the different sides. But is it possible, beginning from objectively existing difficulties in comparing military art, to conclude that a balanced reduction in armed forces and arms is "impossible"?

Of course, it is not. No matter what difficulties may exist in this area, with good will and mutual interest in the success of disarmament talks agreements can be reached on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The history of the disarmament talks shows that military-technical difficulties are not an insuperable barrier to the development, signing, and observance of such agreements. This is proven by many currently existing agreements in the sphere of disarmament.

The existing agreements also refute the arguments of those bourgeois political scientists who, taking advantage of military-technical difficulties in disarmament, recognize the need for disarmament in words but in fact try to prove that it is "impossible" for lack of means of effective international monitoring. This viewpoint is held, in particular, by the American writers S. Possony and J. Purnelle, who urge the United States "not to trust its security to so-called disarmament agreements to any extent" because the problem of reliable monitoring of compliance with disarmament agreements has not been solved.⁶¹

The authors of the monograph "The Dynamics of the Arms Race" take a similar position. The monograph states that 115 types of guarantees of international agreements have been used in history since 1815. But not one of them can be used as a means of effective international monitoring.⁶²

The problem of finding effective measures of international and national monitoring has been discussed many times at such prestigious

international forums as the Pugwash conferences. The fifth conference adopted a statement which acknowledged the difficulty of monitoring compliance with disarmament agreements related to the fact that many types of weapons, for example biological and chemical weapons, can be produced at civilian enterprises. But this refers only to special, and by no means the principal lines of the arms race. Thanks to the development of science and technology, the main spheres of the arms race are entirely susceptible even to national monitoring equipment.

The question of monitoring remains one of the lines of attack by the American "hawks" on the SALT-II treaty. According to them, considering experience in compliance with agreements reached earlier, the Soviet Union cannot be trusted. "Only unscrupulous and irresponsible loudmouths," A. A. Gromyko said, "could permit themselves to reproach the USSR for failure to fulfill obligations under the above-mentioned agreements with the United States. And this is done for a very definite purpose, to hinder negotiations, especially concerning further steps to limit strategic arms, and to harm Soviet-American relations in general."⁶³

The opponents of SALT-II added one more argument to their arsenal in connection with the events in Iran. As a result of the revolution in Iran American bases from which the United States monitored Soviet territory had to be shut down.⁶⁴ Because it is impossible to check fulfillment of SALT-II obligations without them, they claim, the treaty should not be ratified.

This concern about the problem of monitoring is strange to say the least if we consider that official Washington documents recognize the possibility of "verification" of SALT. For example, in early 1978 the U. S. Department of State sent a report to Senator J. Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which observed that "the SALT-II agreement can be properly checked. This conclusion is based on an evaluation of the possibility of monitoring both particular points of the agreement and the agreement as a whole."⁶⁵

Prominent Western military observer P. Kramer writes about the existence of effective means of national monitoring in his article "Monitoring Compliance with the SALT-II Agreement."⁶⁶ He shows persuasively that with the tracking systems available in the national arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union compliance with the SALT-II agreement can be monitored with almost 100-percent effectiveness.

Statements by respected bourgeois authors show that the arguments of the ideologists of the military-industrial complex to the effect that monitoring compliance with disarmament treaties is "impossible" are completely false, unfounded, and fabricated.

Despite the irrefutable facts, however, many bourgeois authors continue to cast doubt on the possibility of limiting the arms race. Some of them

say that all agreements on disarmament are useless because, in their opinion, the arms race will nonetheless outdo the course of negotiations. This idea is even expressed by G. Kennan in evaluating the prospects of the SALT negotiations. "Even the most favorable results which could be expected after the completion of these negotiations will hardly be sufficient," he writes. "The main reason is that the rate of improvement in military hardware is greater than the probable rate of any such negotiations. The technical possibilities under consideration when instructions for the two delegations are written up will already have changed to some extent by the time the talks are completed, and therefore any agreements reached will lag behind the development of events."⁶⁷

Statements such as these cultivate distrust of disarmament negotiations among the masses of ordinary people and paralyze the struggle of the working people to limit the arms race. "The fact which we are witnessing today," H. Bertram, director of the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, exclaims tragically, "is the crisis of our ability to solve the problems of disarmament."⁶⁸

It is obvious, however, that these possibilities depend decisively on the policies of the state, on the line which it follows in the world arena. The impasses in the way of solving the problem of disarmament do not arise by themselves, they are the result of the fact that the Western powers not only fail to show the proper interest in stopping the arms race but rather, by contrast, try in every way they can to stir it up even further.

In the disarmament talks Western diplomats use long-familiar techniques: they propose demands that they know are unacceptable to the socialist countries, that conflict with their security interests; they exaggerate the difficulties of monitoring; they tie specific disarmament questions to other political problems that have nothing in common with disarmament; finally, the talks are dragged out by technical debates that lead away from the essential subject. These kinds of actions unjustifiably lengthen disarmament talks and ultimately lead to a situation where when an agreement is to be signed the continuing process of improvement of military hardware in practice negates its effectiveness. But this result is the fruit of conscious activity by the leaders of the capitalist countries. Attempts to blame some kind of "fatal laws of the arms race" for it are unfounded.

Of course, practical implementation of disarmament is a truly difficult matter. However, bourgeois authors use every means to exaggerate the difficulties of solving the problem and to create the impression that the human race is impotent when faced with the arms race. Such actions do not help solve the problem of disarmament at all, they make it more difficult.

The actions of the ruling circles of the PRC aimed at aggravating the international situation are a major obstacle on the road to military detente and disarmament. Having made a truly fantastic turnaround in politics from ambitious claims to the role of leader of the world revolutionary process to an open counterrevolutionary conspiracy with the most diehard imperialist reactionaries in just two decades, the Beijing leaders have openly taken up the path of preparing for world thermo-nuclear war and an unprecedented arms race. This PRC policy was pre-determined by its position with respect to the issues of disarmament.

The Chinese leadership worked out a whole system of "theoretical" conceptions and doctrines to substantiate its military line. We refer here to the Maoist definition of the age, the conception of "three worlds," and the argument to the effect that detente is "illusory." However, the principal ideological doctrine, aimed at spurring on the arms race and involving the world's peoples in war, is the conception of the "inevitability" and "usefulness" of another world war. China today is virtually the only country in the world whose official circles publicly appear as apologists for world slaughter. "The third world war cannot be avoided," Deng Xiaoping argued in a talk with Japanese journalists on 21 July 1975. "It is possible that many people will die in this war. But this war will make it easier to solve the problems of the repressed peoples and of the human race. It is not so bad."⁶⁹ And at the 11th Congress of the CPC Hua Guofeng asserted that the outbreak of a world war "does not depend on people's will."⁷⁰

In addition to the thesis of the "inevitability" of war the Chinese leadership tries to prove the necessity of war as good for the people. After the 11th Congress of the CPC propaganda intensified for the thesis that when war does break out, the peoples of the world will find themselves in an "advantageous," "favorable" position.⁷¹ An article in RENMIN RIBAO on 1 November 1977 glorified the Maoist conception of "Three Worlds," asserting that nothing bad will happen if war breaks out because during the war "peoples of different countries in different parts of the world will have favorable opportunities to organize wars against aggression. And after prolonged, unified efforts the peoples of the world will finally destroy the instigators of war, the USSR and the United States." In other words, the great-power hegemonistic goals of the Chinese leadership, whose objective is to create a great Chinese state on a nationalistic basis, will be accomplished by means of war.

After advancing the ridiculous thesis of the "inevitability" and even "desirability" of war, Beijing began unprecedented preparations for a worldwide conflict. Within the country militarization of the economy and all aspects of the life of Chinese society intensified on a scale which was not even imagined during the life of Mao Zedong. Day after day the propaganda apparatus of the Chinese leadership drives home to the Chinese people the idea of the necessity of preparing for

"tomorrow's war." "War is a contest of strength. If we prepare fully in advance, victory will be guaranteed," preaches the organ of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee, the newspaper JIEFANGXUN BAO.⁷²

The policy of the "four modernizations" which was widely proclaimed, has been entirely subordinated to military preparations. "Modernization of agriculture, industry, science, and technology is the foundation and prerequisite for modernizing state defense," the journal HONGCI emphasized.⁷³ In February-March 1978 the first session of the All-Chinese Assembly of National Representatives, fifth convocation, was held in Beijing. One of the basic problems posed by it was technical re-equipping of the army on the basis of formation of a modern military industry and using the latest advances of science and technology both in China and abroad. Chinese military circles are demanding that "we have everything that the enemy has, and things that the enemy does not have."⁷⁴

Beijing shows no originality in finding arguments to support the arms race. As already mentioned above, reactionary imperialist circles, opposing the desire of peoples for disarmament and military detente, spread the idea that policy "from a position of strength" serves the cause of protecting peace and that militarization is, they say, essential to stimulate economic development and scientific-technical progress and to reduce unemployment. For its part, Beijing propaganda, in arguing for the militarization of China, asserts that "defense needs can stimulate development of the economy. With the development of military industry there will definitely be a steady stream of new demands made on all sectors of industry, science, and technology, thus promoting the development of the entire national economy and raising the level of science and technology."⁷⁵ All the resources of the Beijing ideological apparatus have been employed to substantiate the necessity of accelerated development of those industrial sectors which will promote the formation of a "powerful China," capable of waging modern warfare.

The negative attitude of Beijing toward problems of disarmament follows logically from the strategic policy of the PRC leadership with respect to total militarization of the entire life of the state, converting China into a mighty military power, and intensifying preparations for war.

Pursuing the goal of putting the PRC "outside the framework" of disarmament obligations, the Beijing leaders declare that it "must begin with disarmament of the two super powers." This is reinforced by the persistent efforts of Beijing to include itself in the "third world." According to their conception, the "third world" countries, the PRC included, should build up their armaments for the purpose of "strengthening defense capacity" at the same time as the "two super powers" will, in their view, be disarming.

At this point Beijing has not only failed to sign a single international agreement leading toward disarmament, but also has used every means to thwart all initiatives in this area. It opposes a ban on all means of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological or new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, and supports the arms race both for China and for the rest of the countries in the world. The essential point of the Chinese position is that as long as China has "very few nuclear weapons" it will not agree to any steps in the disarmament field. And China will, as its representatives to the United Nations openly declare, oppose all such steps for they can only interfere with its "development of its own nuclear potential."⁷⁶

It is common knowledge that China opposes both all-encompassing and partial solutions to the complex problems of nuclear disarmament. The Chinese delegation calls for a global nuclear race from the platform of the United Nations. In his first speech at the 26th session of the U. N. General Assembly on problems of disarmament on 24 November 1971 the delegate from China declared that "in the absence of a complete ban on and complete destruction of nuclear weapons it is impossible to expect other countries, which are subject to the threats of the two nuclear powers, not to develop nuclear weapons for the purposes of self defense." As time went on China said more. From the next, 27th session of the U. N. General Assembly until the present day, employing the same fabricated pretext of a "threat by the two nuclear superpowers," the Chinese representative has called for the development of nuclear potential or "nuclear defense capacity" by those countries which have only a few nuclear weapons or none at all.⁷⁷

In other words, the Beijing position is that as long as nuclear and non-nuclear powers are on different levels of development with respect to weapons of mass destruction, it is impossible to reach agreement on nuclear disarmament and that this subject can be discussed only when all states have accumulated equivalent nuclear arsenals and the non-nuclear states have created "their own defensive nuclear potential." But this is plainly ridiculous, because the nuclear weapons race could go on indefinitely with such an approach, with all the economic, political, and military consequences that would follow. Stability in international affairs with complete equality cannot be secured by continuing the race, which is what Beijing strives for by every means; it can be done by effective steps toward complete elimination of the nuclear arsenals of all states that possess them, as envisioned by the corresponding Soviet proposals and U. N. resolutions supported by a majority of United Nations members.

At a time when there is growing protest throughout the world against the dangerous decision of the NATO Council to deploy medium-range American nuclear missiles in Europe, the Chinese are announcing their full support. Such desires on the part of Beijing are understandable, for deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles on the European

continent should, in the thinking of the Beijing leaders, lead to an aggravation of relations between the Western European countries and the socialist community. This will intensify the danger of a military conflict in Western Europe, which is an old Beijing dream.

The Chinese newspapers regularly publish specially selected statements by advocates of the neutron bomb. In one of these selections RENMIN RIBAO explained that the neutron bomb is a "tactical" weapon and "not such a bad one."⁷⁸ It is typical that the Chinese newspapers did not publish a single report on the massive demonstration, the inquiries in parliaments, and statements by scientists and public figures against the neutron bomb and its deployment in several Western European countries. President Carter's decision, made under the pressure of public opinion, to postpone production of the neutron bomb was received negatively in China,⁷⁹ and the commentary that was made was flagrantly provocative: the latest U. S. concession has produced nothing, and only led to a strengthening of the USSR, which is demanding more concessions.⁸⁰

Beijing's lack of interest in solving the problems of disarmament and its resistance to any, even partial steps toward limiting the arms race are dictated by the current domestic and foreign policy of the Chinese leadership. They are aware, however, that they will not be able to disregard solutions to the most pressing problems of the day so easily, and so they are trying to advance various preliminary conditions. Here is one of them.

At the 30th session of the U. N. General Assembly the PRC representative in the First Committee stated that "China is ready to stop its nuclear testing at any time, but this can only occur when the superpowers completely ban and completely destroy their nuclear weapons, not before."⁸¹ This and similar statements by the Chinese leadership are nothing but an attempt to create Chinese nuclear superiority: the nuclear powers destroy their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, while Beijing only stops nuclear testing, while keeping its entire accumulated arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.

The unseemly maneuvers of Chinese representatives related to completely impractical, fabricated so-called preliminary conditions do not arise from a concern for advancing the cause of disarmament. Refusing to cooperate constructively in solving the problems of disarmament, China is carefully calculating how to complicate and delay the development of all measures and steps in this field.

Careful study of the PRC position on questions of disarmament and also of the arguments used by the Chinese leadership in support of their position on these issues confirms once again the conclusion of the CPSU that Beijing today has changed from a reserve force of imperialism into an ally, that it has essentially begun to play the role of a striking detachment of imperialist reaction. There is essentially nothing new

in the militaristic theories of the PRC; they are merely a repetition of the worn out dogmas of Western military ideas. Taking an extremely negative position on all issues of disarmament and rejecting all initiatives of the USSR and the other socialist countries in this arena from the start, spurring on the unrestrained arms race, and carrying out undisguised preparations for a third world war, the Beijing hegemonists are playing the role of the striking force of the enemies of disarmament, increasing international tension, and creating a serious threat to the cause of peace.

L. I. Brezhnev, describing the current phase of the ideological struggle concerning the problem of disarmament, stressed: "We cannot fail to see the real facts. The advocates of the arms race use any fabrication, even non-existent ones, so to speak, to heat up the situation and spur on military preparations."⁸²

Concealed behind all the varied arguments of the opponents of arms reduction is the obvious desire of the military-industrial complex to avoid losing very profitable business. Those circles in the Western countries which would like to return to a "cold war" atmosphere have an interest in continuation of the arms race, which leads to undermining detente.

At the same time, analysis of the principal bourgeois and Maoist conceptions of the enemies of disarmament shows that the apologists of militarism are unable to present any convincing argument for continuation of the arms race. This is not accidental, for in our day building up military arsenals is fraught with such catastrophic consequences for the entire human race that there is no intelligent alternative to disarmament.

The CPSU consistently and creatively follows a policy of strengthening peace, international detente, and disarmament. As emphasized in the letter of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko to U. N. General Secretary K. Waldheim concerning the challenges of the second decade of disarmament, the "position of the USSR in principle remains unchanged. The Soviet Union is ready to limit and ban any type of weapons on a mutual basis by agreement with other states. Needless to say, this means without detriment to the security of any country, under conditions of full mutuality among states possessing the corresponding armaments."⁸³ Our entire experience, and in particular the events of recent times, shows that the only possible way to strengthen peace and international security is to fight consistently and decisively against the enemies of peace, against the aggressive forces of imperialism and the forces of international hegemonism who pit their policy of international domination, intensifying the arms race, and returning to confrontation in the international arena against our policy of detente and disarmament. Leading circles in the United States of America have now adopted this reactionary policy, which has led to complication of the international situation.

But despite the tense international atmosphere that is now taking shape and the construction of obstacles on the path to military detente by the United States and other Western countries, the countries of the socialist community, the movement of nonaligned states, and all world democratic opinion are convinced that sooner or later the problem of disarmament will be resolved. This problem is put on the agenda by history itself and the need to solve it is dictated by the interests of preserving international peace and security and continued human advance along the path of social and scientific-technical progress.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA 7 October 1979.
2. PRAVDA 13 January 1980.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 45, p 319.
4. "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1976, p 22.
5. Middleton, D. "Can America Win the Next War?" New York, 1975, p 12.
6. Hill-Norton, P., "No Soft Option," London, 1978, p 145.
7. NEW YORK REVIEW 9 March 1979.
8. Kennan, G., "The Cloud of Danger," Boston-Toronto, 1977, p 30.
9. REVUE DE L'OTAN 1976, No 3, p 11.
10. "Defense Year Book, 1976-1977," London, 1977, p 100.
11. KOMMUNIST 1980, No 3, p 79.
12. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDONARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA 1978, No 12, p 19.
13. THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 27 November 1977, p 52.
14. Ibid., p 54. (The MIRV is an intercontinental ballistic missile with separating nose cone).
15. Kennan, G., op. cit., pp 45-46.
16. Ibid., p 47.
17. Blechman, B., and Kaplan, S., "U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument," Washington, 1978, p 16.
18. "Materialy..." op. cit., p 22.

19. Brezhnev, L. I., "Leninskii Kursom" [By a Leninist Course], Vol 6, Moscow, 1978, p 262.
20. THE NEW YORK TIMES 9 January 1980.
21. PRAVDA 13 January 1980.
22. OSTEUROPA No 1, 1973, p 25.
23. Brzezinski, Z., "Between Two Ages. America's Role in the Techno-tronic Era," New York, 1970, p 264.
24. Raven, W., "Sicherheit in Spanningsfeld," Bonn, 1972, p 55.
25. Andren, H., and Birnbaum, K., "Beyond Detente: Prospects for East-West Cooperation and Security in Europe," London 1976, p 188.
26. SEA POWER, Vol 18, No 5, Washington, 1975, p 10.
27. IZVESTIYA 22 August 1975.
28. "Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird, M. R. on the F. Y. 1972-1976 Year Program and 1972 Year Budget," Washington, 1971, p 2.
29. THE NEW YORK TIMES 13 December 1979.
30. PRAVDA 3 December 1961.
31. Clausewitz, K., "O Voyni" [On War], Vol 1, Moscow, 1941, p 299.
32. See "Kritika Burzhuaznykh Kontseptsii Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoy Revolyutsii" [Critique of the Bourgeois Conceptions of the Scientific-Technical Revolution], Moscow, 1976, p 259.
33. Cited from Zhores, Zh., "Protiv Voyny i Kolonial'noy Politiki" [Against War and Colonial Policy], Moscow, 1961, p 218.
34. Krosser, P., "Dialektika Voennoy Tekhniki i Yeye Posledstva" [The Dialectic of Military Technology and Its Repercussions], Moscow, 1975, p 135.
35. Brezhnev, L. I., op. cit., vol 4, Moscow, 1974, pp 339-340.
36. Lenin, V. I., op. cit., Vol 28, p 179.
37. Ayres, C., "The Industrial Economy," Boston, 1952, p 178.
38. Galbrejt, D., "Novoye Industrial'noye Obshchestvo" [The New Industrial Society], Moscow, 1969, pp 278-279.

39. Hitch, Ch., and Makkin, R., "Voyennaya Ekonomika v Yadernyy Vek" [The War Economy in the Nuclear Age], Moscow, 1967, pp 124, 125, 132.
40. Vilmar, F., "Rüstung und Abrüstung im Spätkapitalismus," Hamburg, 1978, p 171.
41. NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS 1975, No 1, p 13.
42. See Paramazyan, R. A., "Razoruzheniye i Ekonomika" [Disarmament and the Economy], Moscow, 1978, p 122.
43. See MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 8, 1972, p 7, p 4 (appendix).
44. Podol'skiy, N. V., "Razoruzheniye — Aktual'naya Problema Sovremennosti" [Disarmament — Pressing Problem of the Times], Moscow, 1977, pp 26-27.
45. "American Militarism 1970," New York, 1970, p 91.
46. Vasin, V. P., "Imperialisticheskiy Militarizm" [Imperialist Militarism], Minsk, 1976, p 233.
47. IZVESTIYA 31 March 1968.
48. "The Budget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 1978," Washington, 1978, p 488.
49. Paramazyan, R. A., op. cit., p 75.
50. Holl, G., "Revolutsionnoye Dvizhenie i Sovremennyy Imperializm" [The Revolutionary Movement and Contemporary Imperialism], Moscow, 1974, pp 91-92.
51. Yarmolinsky, C., "The Military Establishment. Its Impact on American Society," New York, 1971, p 244.
52. Kanan, D., "The Superwarriors," New York, 1975, p 374.
53. Melman, S., "The Permanent War Economy. American Capitalism in Decline," New York, 1974, p 114.
54. Kolko, G., "Main Currents in American History," New York, 1976, p 345.
55. Collins, D. and Cordsman, A., "Imbalance of Power. Shifting U. S. - Soviet Military Strength," San Rafael-London, 1978, p 6.
56. Ibid., p 19.

57. Collins, D., "American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Crisis," Washington, 1978, p 51.
58. McGovern, G., "Detente and the New American Administration," Washington, 1978, p 57.
59. Hill-Norton, P., op. cit., p 30.
60. Afford, J., "The Future of Arms Control," New York, 1979, pp 22-25.
61. Poussy, S. and Purnelle, J., "The Strategy of Technology," Guillen, 1979, p 188.
62. "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," London, 1975, p 216.
63. PRAVDA 7 July 1978.
64. PRAVDA 22 February 1979.
65. "Department of State Bulletin," Vol 78, No 2013, 1978.
66. LA LIBRE BELGIQUE 10 January 1978.
67. Kennan, G., op. cit., p 85.
68. THE TIMES 2 November 1978.
69. RENMIN RIBAO 22 July 1975.
70. RENMIN RIBAO 25 August 1977.
71. "The Eleventh All-Chinese Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)," Beijing, 1977, p 34 (in Chinese).
72. JIEFANGXUN BAO 12 Jun 1977.
73. HUNGCI July 1977, p 7.
74. RENMIN RIBAO 15 March 1978.
75. "Study of the Work 'on the Ten Most Important Interrelationships,'" Beijing, 1977, p 31 (in Chinese).
76. RENMIN RIBAO 5 October 1972.
77. Ibid.
78. RENMIN RIBAO 28 January 1978.

79. RENMIN RIBAO 4 April 1978.
80. RENMIN RIBAO 12 April 1978.
81. "Document A/C IPU 2095 of the Thirtieth Session of the U. N. General Assembly," p 37.
82. PRAVDA 7 October 1979.
83. PRAVDA 13 April 1980.

COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", "Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya", 1980.

11,176
CSO: 1800

INTERNATIONAL

U.S., PRC ENCOURAGE MILITARIZATION OF JAPAN

Moscow NOVOSTI DAILY REVIEW in English 4 Oct 80 pp 1-4

[Commentary by Andrei Betushkin]

[Text] It has become particularly obvious of late that Japan tends to go against its own constitution which states clearly: "...the Japanese people for ever renounce war as the sovereign right of the nation and also the threat or use of armed force as a means of settling international disputes. Never again will it set up ground, naval and air forces, nor any other means of warfare."

These provisions of the constitution, however, do not seem to suit the reactionary, right-wing circles of Japan who in league with US expansionists want to involve Japan in an aggressive policy hostile to the interests of its people. These circles, under pressure from Washington, are openly urging the quickest possible boosting of Japan's military potential to enable it to act as a major military world power.

The country is now feverishly militarising its economy and increasing so-called "self-defence forces." Militarist- and revenge-minded elements are rearing their heads, conducting an open campaign of indoctrination of the population in the anti-Soviet spirit and trying to justify Japan's past wars of aggression, rehabilitate the war criminals and foment chauvinist sentiments. Youth are told of the "valour" of the Emperor's army, the spirit of samurais, and the "feats" of the suicide pilots of the Second World War. There is even an intention mooted to erect a monument to the main war criminals.

What is going on in Japan, a country which after the Second World War embarked on the course of renouncing all militarism, a course suggested by its historical experience and meeting its national interests? What is behind the recent military boom and why is this militarist frenzy cultivated among the population who are intimidated with the non-existent "Soviet military threat" in the Far East? Surely, through all the post-war period the Soviet Union has been only advocating peaceful neighbourly relations and mutually advantageous cooperation with Japan.

The United States and China undoubtedly bear a most direct relation to Japan's assumption of its militarist and revenge-seeking course. The United States has actually nourished the Japanese military-industrial complex and developed its few police formations into modern armed forces. Under the "Security Treaty," imposed on the Japanese people under the pretext of protecting them against "world communism," the country's territory is used by US troops, nuclear arms depots, aircraft and ships, that is, is being equipped as a theatre of operations. Japan has undertaken to assist in the deployment of US armed forces in the Pacific, to spend more on the maintenance of US military bases on its territory and guarantee the United States their full use both in peace and war time. The White Paper, recently approved by the Japanese Cabinet, says it is necessary to strengthen the Japanese-US military-political alliance, expresses readiness to increase military spending as required by Washington, and calls for the "shortcomings" of the Japanese army to be remedied by equipping it quickly with the most up-to-date weapons.

As is noted in the Japanese press, Japan's military circles, under pressure from the Pentagon, are now preparing to revise the laws on "self-defence forces" with the aim of lifting the restrictions on their size. Japanese generals more and more vigorously advocate equipping the army with tactical nuclear weapons, and chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. In defiance of the existing constitution and the 1945 Potsdam declaration, they plan to set up a Defence Ministry, a general staff and a central intelligence agency, i.e. top military bodies that existed in Japan prior to surrender and were abolished as a source of militarism and war.

The "self-defence forces" are used as a front for creating a most modern regular army capable of mounting offensive operations. Japan's ground forces already number five field armies, thirteen divisions, several brigades, including air-and helicopter-borne ones, as well as more than a dozen special units. Its air force and navy have considerable operational formations and combat strength. Altogether, there are 270,000 men in Japan's armed forces, plus over 50,000 in the permanent reserves. In their fighting capacity the "self-defence forces" now exceed the Japanese army of the Second World War. Yet even despite this the ground air and naval commands are creating fresh units equipped with up-to-date weapons. The military programme to improve the armed forces for 1980-1984 has allocated more than 60,000 million dollars for the purpose, or more than Japan has spent on its forces over the past 20 years. Under the programme, the army is receiving new tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, modern warplanes and helicopters, ships and other fighting equipment. In 1980 alone, Japan will spend more than 10,000 million dollars to these ends, or 6.5 per cent more than last year.

The "self-defence forces" jointly exercise with US troops, increasingly practicing offensive operations. Recently, as part of such exercises, the Japanese naval forces operated outside their territorial waters.

Japanese generals feel cramped within Japan proper and do not let up attempts to get a law accepted, allowing the forces to operate on a wider geographical scale.

Japan has built and continues to develop extensive munitions facilities capable of turning out modern arms--warships, combat planes, tanks and other materiel. Over 2,000 Japanese companies are manufacturing armaments. Intensive research and development work is pursued in the latest types of weaponry, including missiles and laser. In the 70s Japan's munitions industry met nearly all requirements of its "self-defence forces." At the moment the militarisation is getting a new impulse. The Finance Ministry and the Defence Agency have agreed to increase military expenses in the coming financial year by almost 10 per cent and to step up the fulfillment of all military programmes. This means that the Agency will get a record sum (11,000 million dollars) in the new state budget. According to the JAPAN TIMES, the military spending ceiling would probably be raised still higher, because the US allies insist on stepped-up military preparations and the fulfillment of military programmes a year ahead of schedule.

Washington has of late shown an intention to include China in the US-Japanese military alliance. What is the attitude to this in Peking? It appears it not only welcomes the increased military presence of the United States in Asia, but also advocates the growth of Japan's military might. It even plays up to the Japanese militarist circles, encouraging their revenge-seeking sentiments against the Soviet Union. During his visits to Japan in 1978 and 1979 Deng Xiaoping claimed that the Japanese-US "security treaty" was "vitally important." He called on the Tokyo leading circles at the time to increase the number of US military bases on the Japanese islands, and to augment the Japanese military potential, pressing for the establishment of a united front against the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Kampuchea.

For these "services" Washington intends to "talk" Japan into giving Peking equipment which can be used for military purposes. The TOKYO SHIMBUN reports, for example, that it has already been decided to develop Sino-Japanese contacts and to deepen bilateral exchanges of military information and experts. China expects to get Japanese technology for the rapid development of its own war industry. Peking is pressing for Japan's assistance in the development of uranium deposits and shows a heightened interest in the Japanese technology of enriching the nuclear fuel. Peking's emissaries worm their way also into other fields of the Japanese economy, concentrating their attention on getting the latest prototypes of military equipment.

And what about Japan? As the facts show, certain circles of that country are not against playing up to Washington and Peking in their dangerous game. Japan's rapprochement with China and the USA is growing on an

increasingly alarming scale. There is even talk of establishing an anti-Soviet "axis" of these states patterned after the "anti-Comintern pact." Japan is assigned in this sinister "alliance" the role of an active military force and advanced bridgehead for US troops to suppress the national liberation movement in Asia and aimed against the socialist countries. Peking, for its part, is seeking to extend its control to new vast areas and establish claim to the new possessions in line with its policy of territorial ambition.

Whose interests will be served by this "new axis?" Naturally, not the interests of the Japanese people, but the expansionist aspirations and "leadership" of Washington and Peking. As for the Japanese and other peoples for that matter, history has graphically shown what misfortunes resulted for them from all sorts of "axes," including the one in which Japan once participated.

Tokyo's militarist course is at odds with the basic national interests and aspirations of the Japanese people. It is fraught also with a threat to the security of other countries. Peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation between states, rather than arms build-up, and membership of all sorts of alliances directed against other countries, can only guarantee the nations peace, security and prosperity.

CSO: 1812

INTERNATIONAL

TAJIKS IN SOVIET-AUSTRIAN EXCHANGES

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 26 Aug 80 p 4

[Interview with Austrian-Soviet Friendship Society official: Carinthia-Dushanbe: "Bridge of Friendship"]

[Text] In the province of Carinthia (one of Austria's southern provinces) and its center--the city of Klagenfurt--the words "Dushanbe" and "Tajikistan" have long been nothing new. Our republic's capital is Klagenfurt's brother-city. In recent years many emissaries of Tajikistan have visited Austria, and our Austrian friends have visited our republic. In accordance with the good tradition which has been established, the Tajik Society of Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries and the branch of the Austro-Soviet Society in Carinthia have maintained constant contacts for several years now and exchanged delegations, tourists and information. A tourist group of active members of the Austro-Soviet Friendship Society headed by Dr Anton Hofstaedter, general director of the Carinthian Power-Supply Association and chairman of the board of the branch of the Austro-Soviet Society, has been visiting Dushanbe.

The tour of the republic was interesting for us primarily from a professional viewpoint for the male side of our group is connected with power engineering in one way or another, was how Dr Hofstaedter began his conversation with our correspondent M. Lebedev on his impressions of his stay in Tajikistan. I will give you my personal opinion, but it concurs with that of my colleagues, and they have instructed me to speak in their behalf also (the group includes Austrian Bundesrat Chairman Herr Trater, representatives of the provincial administration of Carinthia and the labor unions of power enterprises, power station workers and others).

This is my second time in Tajikistan. I first visited your hospitable republic 8 years ago. And much has been affected by change even in this comparatively short period. Dushanbe, it seems to me, has become even more beautiful and has somehow expanded. Many modern houses have appeared, and their finishing has become more imaginative. I have seen many beautifully designed store fronts, which also beautifies the city.

On my first trip we were shown schools, kindergarten and other sociocultural facilities. On this occasion our trip was connected more with production, and, judging by the figures given us by Dushanbe Mayor Kim Nazirov at a meeting in the gorispolkom, the Tajikistan capital has made big strides ahead in economic development. We were shown the Dushanbe people's plans for the coming 5-year plan. What is planned would strike any imagination.

[Question] What particularly attracted your attention in these plans or, as you put it, "struck" you?

[Answer] Of course, the scale and the confidence that it will be achieved. We were shown the plan of a new microregion in Dushanbe. This will practically be a city within a city. After all, building it will mean solving a mass of problems connected with housing, organization of the municipal economy and satisfaction of the citizens' cultural requirements.

I believe that the Nurek GES is an example of the republic's confidence in its own capabilities. This is a great installation both in size and provision with equipment. We in Austria do not have the possibility of building such installations. We can only congratulate you on such a construction project. Nurek, we believe, demonstrates the great potential of Tajikistan's power engineering. We would now certainly no longer be surprised to learn of the appearance of other power giants in Vakhsh alongside the Nurek GES.

We men, of course, were interested in the technical questions, but our wives (the women in the group are practically all teachers), visiting Ordzhonikidzeabadskiy Rayon's "Kommunizm" Kolkhoz, drew attention to the fact that all the establishments on the farm--the school, house of culture, hospital and kindergarten--do not exist separately from one another but constitute with the kolkhoz a unified whole, like the branches of a tree.

About the hospitality we were shown there can be only one opinion. We were received with such cordiality and warmth that we will long remember these days.

We greeted with interest the suggestion that we attend a friendly meeting in the Friendship Society. Here we met old acquaintances--representatives of the society and the gorispolkom and artistes of the "Rokhat" Ensemble who had visited us in Carinthia last year.

We recalled a concert in Klagenfurt's concert hall, which seats 2,500 people, to which many Klagenfurters came dressed in Tajik national costume (after all, our mutual visits have become traditional). You can meet young Klagenfurters who speak Tajik and who know the works of Rudaki, Aini and Lakhuti. The small library in Tajik once sent from Dushanbe to Klagenfurt has come in useful. The past invitation to Dushanbe of a group of students of one of Klagenfurt's preparatory schools was of great significance in strengthening the friendship between the peoples of our countries and between the inhabitants of our cities.

I believe that after the meetings on Tajik soil it will be difficult for us to compete with Dushanbe in hospitality. But you can be sure that Tajikistan's emissaries will be greeted as the dearest guests.

[Question] Since the conversation has gotten around to competition, I would like to know the opinion of the tourists from Austria about the recent 22d Olympics in Moscow.

[Answer] I like to talk about sports. I am quite passionate about skating, but am also interested in summer types of sport. Austrian television carried the Moscow Olympics in full, as far as was possible. Of course, the Olympics' opening and closing ceremonies made a great impression.

The 1980 Games also brought Austrian sport and its numerous fans Olympic medals. Our athletes won 1 gold, 3 silver and 1 bronze medals. This compared with a single bronze in Montreal. And the Austrian team won a gold for the first time in 20 years. Elisabeth Teurer brought back the long-awaited Olympic gold medal from Moscow, coming first in dressage. She was the only one of our country's equestrians to decide to take part in the Moscow Olympics. And she proved that this desire was not in vain, winning the sympathy of the spectators in Moscow and at home.

The boycott was defeated in the tournaments of the Moscow Olympics. The spirit of mutual understanding triumphed.

8850

CSO: 1800

INTERNATIONAL

AFGHAN JOURNALISTS VISIT TAJIKISTAN

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 23 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] TAJIK TELEGRAPH AGENCY--On 22 August journalists from the local newspapers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan arrived in Tajikistan and conducted interviews at the Division of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan [CPTa]. In free interviews with the Chief of the Division, I. Klandarov acquainted the Afghan guests with the structure of the division and the methods of party leadership in dealing with dissemination of mass information within the republic.

On the same day, the Afghan journalist met with colleagues from the republic newspaper TAJIKISTAN SOVIET. Colleagues from other newspapers and journals took part in the interview.

The Afghan journalists visited the Historical Museum for Regional Studies and Fine Arts imeni Bekhzod and were shown a documentary film on Soviet Tajikistan.

Journalists from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will be in Tajikistan for a few days where they will become acquainted with the working organs for dissemination of mass information within the republic.

9139

CSO: 1800

INTERNATIONAL

TAJIK PUBLIC HEALTH GROUP IN AFGHANISTAN

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 6 Jul 80 p 2

[Interview with Yu. B. Iskhaki, chancellor of the Tajik State Medical Institute imeni Abual ibn-Sino, by a correspondent of the TAJIK TELEGRAPH AGENCY; date and place not given]

[Text] Professor Yu. B. Iskhaki, chancellor of the Tajik State Medical Institute imeni Abual ibn-Sino, visited Afghanistan as a member of the delegation of the USSR Ministry of Health. For 7 days, members of the delegation examined the conditions of medical services in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

"New Afghanistan was born as the result of a hard struggle in cruel circumstances. But even in these conditions, the Central Committee of the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Revolutionary Council were created to insure peace, equality and social justice and to develop economic and scientific technology in the country. One of their most pressing goals is to fight illiteracy and to conquer various diseases. Aid to the Afghan people in the area of public health, as in other areas, is being provided by Soviet specialists. The goal of our delegation was to outline a specific plan to expand this aid.

We studied the activities of many clinics, institutes of malaria, institutes of serology and vaccines as well as emergency services; we visited the Ministry of Public Health and were then invited to attend the first congress of Afghan doctors in Kabul.

Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan, president of the Revolutionary Council and prime minister of Afghanistan, spoke at the congress. He underscored the enormous importance of repairing the country's health services as well as the importance of the visiting Soviet doctors' efforts to help their Afghan colleagues in this work.

Members of our delegation also spoke at the congress. I delivered a speech on methods of training physicians in the USSR using Tajikistan

as an example. I stressed that the experience of our republic, in which the development of public health services occurred within an historically short period, would be of interest to our Afghan friends.

The question of the value of the experience of Soviet health was again brought up when the delegation met Babrak Karmal. The head of the Afghan government noted, in an interview, that the problems facing Afghanistan in many areas of life, particularly in the area of safeguarding public health, had been successfully resolved in the republics of Soviet Central Asia and that their development was particularly relevant for Afghanistan.

A new medical institute is now being established in Kabul. Many types of aid will be provided by a kollektiv of our medical institute in forming the institute. We will impart the programs and methods for training future physicians. A lecture series by Dushanbe professors and instructors will be presented at the Kabul Medical Institute. Afghan doctors will visit departments of our institutes. The first group of Afghan youths to successfully pass the course have already enrolled at the Tajik State Medical Institute imeni Abual ibn-Sino.

During the trip, our delegation time and again encountered facts, which testify to the continuing intrigues by enemies of the Afghan revolution, who are trying to impede the building of a new society in Afghanistan.

The imperialists and forces of internal reaction have resorted to the most barbaric methods and crimes. We saw burned schools, hospitals and mosques; we were told how mercenaries had viciously murdered teachers, physicians, workers at state enterprises and even schoolchildren.

But we also saw volunteers who were restoring schools, hospitals and other institutions. In museums we saw terrorist weapons of American, Chinese and English manufacture. We also saw wigs with which the murderers disguised themselves as Afghan moslems. All this shows the altogether repulsive acts of the enemies of the Afghan revolution which is supported by the people.

9139

CSO: 1800

INTERNATIONAL

BANKRUPTCY OF MAOIST IDEOLOGY EXPOSED

Moscow SOVOSTI DAILY REVIEW in English 4 Oct 80 pp 1-3

[Commentary by Igor Sinitsin, APN political analyst]

[Text] Peking has announced the establishment of a special Procurator's Office and a special court to consider the case of the groupings of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing which were defeated in the power struggle with Mao's present heirs. Ten orthodox Maoists united by the case of "counter-revolutionary groupings" will be put on trial. Jiang Qing, Mao's widow, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyan, Wang Hongwen--members of the "Gang of four" and also former military leaders close to Lin Biao, Mao's official heir who mysteriously perished--Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qui Huizuo, Jiang Tengjiao, and also Chen Boda. In the extremely complicated and intricate internal political situation in China at the surface of which the open confrontation between the faction of Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng is even more conspicuous the power forces of great-Han chauvinism are interested in separating by this trial the name of their leader Mao Zedong from his entourage during the outrages of the "Big Leap" and the "cultural revolution."

China's present-day leaders are trying to make the impression that Mao was not involved in the crimes of the Four. However, no matter whether the heirs to Mao want this or not, the whole ideological and political system of Maoism will be put before the bar of history and the Chinese people. No matter whether the trial of the ten former key Party leaders, statesmen and military leaders of Maoist China will be open or closed, the very preparations for it have convincingly demonstrated a crisis of Maoism as an ideology and policy.

The Chinese leaders are now attempting to "whitewash" Maoism from blood, misery, lack of rights which it brought to the Chinese people, and to preserve Mao's course of the militarization of the country, of the preparations for war, to keep intact the line aimed at undermining detente and stepping up world tensions, at leaguuing up with the most reactionary imperialist circles, the course which began in Mao's lifetime and on his instructions. This manoeuvring is facilitated

by the fact that Maoism does not represent an integral consistent teaching, but is an eclectic amalgam of controversial theses which is pragmatically used for attaining a definite political goal--the transformation of China into a militarist super-power in Asia.

The small-scale, demagogic and superficial demaoization which found its expression in the removal of some of Mao's portraits in China, in the denunciation of some of his extreme doctrines, like, for instance, the call to crack-down on intellectuals, or in the criticism of such Mao's maxims as "disorder is a good thing" or "poverty is a good thing" apparently cannot exert a sizeable effect on hundreds of millions of Chinese subjected for decades to the cult of Mao's personality. Besides, tens of millions in China who now take their offices in the administrative and Party apparatus and in municipal bodies have found their way to the helm not due to their organizational abilities, professional knowledge or great political experience, but mainly due to their adaptation to the cult of Mao, due to the demonstration of their loyalty to "Mao Zedong's ideas." All these people are interested in the preservation of Mao's cult. They are only at the beginning of the difficult psychological process of the reappraisal of Maoist cliches, of the understanding of the fallacy of Mao's "ideas" for solving China's present-day problems, of their harm to the progress of the Chinese nation. Many of them do not want to yield their positions seized in the course of the "cultural revolution" to the new fangled "pragmatists" who follow in the footsteps of Deng Xiaoping.

This gives rise to sharp contradictions in modern Chinese society, to a struggle around Mao's heritage which has taken the shape of the campaign against the "Gang of Four" and Lin Biao. This struggle is being aggravated by the fact that for about a decade the "Gang of Four" had a monopoly on the interpretation of Mao Zedong's ideas and was a mouth-piece of his slogans. Now the faction of Mao's heirs, headed by Deng, is trying to perform the functions of the oracle and interpreter of the "spirit of Mao Zedong's leadership." Hua Guofeng and his adherents in the state, military and Party apparatus who sprang to the heights of power in the course of the "cultural revolution" are facing the risk of being totally ousted from all their posts.

The power struggle in the Chinese upper crust is being waged against the background of the growing poverty and lack of rights for the masses, against the background of the discontent of twenty million people who are out of job. The problems of democracy, of observing the constitutional rights of Chinese citizens, of the family and the birth rate, of young people, etc are becoming ever more acute.

Maoism has led Chinese society to the crisis of the economic social and cultural institutions. Serious miscalculations and mistakes in planning, and capital construction which have been made by the new Chinese leaders--

"pragmatists" logically continue the blunders of Mao himself and of the former executors of his will. The Chinese people are being again given declarative promises, while real resources are being directed, like under Mao's rule, for militarist purposes, for the preparation of a new war.

At the same time, the experience of the first decade of the People's Republic of China when the country took the path of the building of socialism, has left a deep trace in the life and consciousness of the Chinese working people. Some facts which are coming to the external world from behind the "Great Wall" show that socialist ideals are not yet uprooted in China. These ideals are the safeguard that a true national revival of China is still possible and that its socialist development can be secured.

The trial of the "Gang of Four" and six other Maoists in Peking will once again highlight the ideological and political bankruptcy of Maoism-- the adversary of scientific socialism, the foe of peoples' progress.

CSO: 1812

REGIONAL

ROLE OF LOCAL SOVIETS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRESSED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by L. Yermín, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers: "Dictated by Practice"]

[Text] The soviets' role in solving the main problems of the development of our country's economy, science and culture increases from year to year. The law "The Fundamental Powers of the Kray and Oblast Soviets of People's Deputies and the Soviets of People's Deputies of Autonomous Oblasts and Autonomous Okrugs," which was adopted by the Third Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the 10th Convocation, has opened to them new horizons of creative activity in the leadership of state and sociocultural building. The powers of the local bodies of the people's political power in all spheres of the life of our society have been determined in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. Their diverse activity is being exercised under the leadership of the party committees.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev has pointed out that in economic building there are tasks which no one can accomplish better than the soviets. One of the most important such tasks is the comprehensive economic and social development of the territories under their jurisdiction. The more complex the economic structure, the more responsible the role of the soviets in coordinating the activity of the enterprises and organizations located on their territory.

Henceforward the soviets will have sufficient opportunities to cope with this, proceeding from the highest state interests and in a proprietorial manner. They merely have to make full use of their constitutional powers in monitoring the observance by enterprises and organizations of local, republic and union jurisdiction of legislation in the sphere of land use

and nature conservation and fulfillment of the plans of construction, consumer goods production and sociocultural and consumer services. The soviets have to formulate long-term and annual balances of labor resources, participate in the compilation of territorial balances of the production and distribution of products and programs for solving large-scale regional problems and compile and approve consolidated 5-year and annual plans of the production of local construction materials and consumer goods and of sociocultural building. The benefit of this is shown convincingly by the experience of the soviet authorities of Moscow and Leningrad, Sverdlovskaya and Leningrad Oblast and Krasnoyarskiy Kray, where comprehensive plans have been consistently implemented for several years now.

One such program was summoned into being by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "Measures for the Comprehensive Development of Krasnoyarskiy Kray's Production Forces in the Period 1971-1980." Since 1971 the krayispolkom, with the participation of institutes of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has been persistently implementing this program, which includes a concerted upsurge of the diversified economy and an increase in the construction of housing and sociocultural and everyday facilities and a constant increase in the population's living standard.

The results are striking. Industrial production has almost doubled in these years, new sectors of industry have appeared and the Severo-Krasnoyarskiy and Sayanskiy territorial-production and the Kansk-Achinskiy fuel-energy complexes are taking shape. Apartment houses with a total area of approximately 7 million square meters were introduced and schools for almost 73,000 students and children's establishments for more than 30,000 children and hospitals with 3,400 beds were built in 4 years of the present 5-year plan.

The example of the city of Angarsk, where the programs of economic and social development are discussed in the labor collectives, is also instructive. A commission headed by the gorispolkom chairman has been set up to monitor fulfillment of this city-wide plan. Angarsk is already fully provided with children's preschool establishments, hospitals and polyclinics and almost fully provided with schools and sales and public catering enterprises. With the help of its permanent commissions and groups of deputies the city soviet is coordinating the work of the enterprises and organizations. The hothouse combine created with their several participation is satisfying 95 percent of the sales enterprises' and catering establishments' vegetable requirements, and the city's medical establishments are provided with whole milk.

Yet it is far from always that the local soviet ispolkoms are able to use power in the interests of fulfillment of state plans and observance of the necessary proportions in the development of the economy on the territories under their jurisdiction. They must on no occasion become reconciled to this department or the other endeavoring to reduce the costs and accelerate the construction of enterprises by, say, economizing on the construction of housing and municipal and other sociocultural facilities. Such an

"economy" proves costly. Housing, municipal and cultural-everyday construction is lagging behind the development of production, and provision of the cities and centers of population with amenities is being unduly prolonged.

Measures incorporated in the plans with the consent of the ministries, particularly for sociocultural construction, are sometimes not implemented, which engenders serious disproportions in the development of a city or kray and oblast even. The USSR Ministry of Chemical Industry, Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building, Ministry of Timber and Wood-Processing Industry and the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy have manifestly minimized capital investments in an upsurge of the production forces of the RSFSR's eastern regions compared with the 5-year plan quotas. The USSR Ministry of Coal Industry, which is installing the city of Neryungri--the center of the Yuzhno-Yakutsk coal complex--has fallen behind in the construction of houses for the workers and specialists. The comprehensive development of the city of Tol'yatti is being held back owing to the lag in the commissioning of children's preschool establishments, hospitals, cultural-entertainment establishments and sales and public catering enterprises. In 2 years the Ministry of Automotive Industry and the Ministry of Chemical Industry failed to hand over R49 million for the city's sociocultural construction, and the main contractor--the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification's "Kuybyshevgidrostroy" Administration--fails, as a rule, to fulfill the plans for the installation of such facilities.

Proceeding from departmental interests, the ministries frequently insist on the "attachment" of new enterprises in the large cities and, in spite of the procedure determined by the RSFSR Government, attempt to decide these questions without the participation of the local organs of power. This approach is wrong for it could lead to the excessive concentration of industry in population, particularly in the administrative centers of the European part of the country and the Urals, environmental pollution in areas of big cities and also to considerable deficiencies in the use of labor resources and production capacity. The ispolkoms do not have the right to give in to such departmental endeavors.

The extension of the soviets' rights significantly increases their responsibility for all aspects of economic and cultural building. Many ispolkoms even now act as the single clients of housing and cultural-social facilities, concentrating in their own hands the resources allocated for this purpose to enterprises of local, republic and union jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in the RSFSR more than half of urban housing is still in the hands of various departments. Almost 4,000 enterprises are the proprietors of water mains in the cities and workers' settlements, approximately 2,700 "are in charge of" sewage and 700 maintain hotels with more than 100,000 beds. We must accelerate the handover of housing and municipal service facilities to the local soviets.

The tasks of a further increase in agricultural production also demand their attention. In the RSFSR they have already made a considerable contribution to concentration and specialization in agriculture and to the transition

of its sectors to an industrial footing. Some 973 complexes for milk production and 466 for beef and pork production are currently operating on the republic's kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Some 58 percent of the cows, 65 percent of hogs and approximately 70 percent of the poultry are accommodated in mechanized livestock sections. This has enabled us to reduce labor expenditure on the production of the principal agricultural products and to create a basis for its further growth.

While paying attention to the concentration and specialization of agriculture the soviets at the same time cannot divest themselves of the responsibility for an improvement in the work of the small-scale commodity livestock sections, for an increase in the assistance to the kolkhoz members, workers and employees in keeping private livestock and poultry and for the development of the subsidiary plots attached to the plants, factories and establishments. As the experience of the industrial enterprises of Omskaya, Kuybyshevskaya, Rostovskaya and other oblasts and krais shows, this is an important source of an increase in food resources.

Serious problems also confront the soviets in the implementation of comprehensive programs for the development of the agricultural areas. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree "Measures for the Further Development of the Agriculture of the RSFSR's non-Black Earth Zone" called for a more in-depth study of the processes occurring in the countryside. A decline in the numbers of the rural population in certain regions of Russia is causing concern. An analysis conducted by the local soviets shows that shortcomings in the organization of labor and cultural-everyday services are a reason for this. The marked shortage of municipal and social services compared with the city, the lagging in certain rural areas in the provision of amenities, the lack of good roads and irregularities in trade are reflected in people's frame of mind. This is where the soviet authorities must make exhaustive use of the rights and possibilities granted them by the USSR Constitution. Each instance of the nonfulfillment of plans for the commissioning of apartment houses, schools, children's preschool establishments and hospitals should be regarded as an extraordinary occurrence, and those to blame should be strictly punished. We must create housing-construction cooperatives in the countryside more actively and build paved roads, utilizing kolkhoz and sovkhoz capital and local resources.

A number of rural rayons ceased to concern themselves with so-called nonprospective centers of population. They hastened to close down primary schools and stores there. And people began to leave not only their native villages but the rayons altogether. It is now obvious how difficult it is to rectify such errors. But they must be rectified. As long as this village or the other exists and as long as people live in it, concern must be shown for it. And this is the duty of the soviets.

A cause of migration is the kolkhoz members' and workers' dissatisfaction with the low state of mechanization of labor, its seasonal and unnormed nature and the absence of shift work. Measures formulated on the farms for

the next few years to reduce manual labor to a minimum thanks to an improvement in its organization, the introduction of progressive techniques and an increase in the skills of the agricultural workers will undoubtedly be of benefit here. And the development of subsidiary enterprises and production facilities will make it possible to employ rural workers evenly throughout the year. Who, if not the soviets, should undertake this work?

There are, incidentally, many other questions and tasks which cannot remain beyond the purview of soviets primarily concerned for an improvement in our people's living conditions and the plan-oriented improvement of their dependent territories. Dependent in the very highest meaning of this word signifying a further flourishing of socialist democracy on our soil, where the owners are the people of labor and the creators of material and spiritual values.

The attention of the soviet authorities in the localities is currently concentrated on insuring the successful fulfillment of the plan of the present year and the 5-year plan as a whole and the commissioning of projects nearing completion, preparations for work under winter conditions, the organized completion of the harvesting and the creation of the foundation of next year's harvest. The local soviets of the RSFSR are approaching the 26th party congress with an understanding of their duty to the people and their responsibility for everything affecting the happiness and well-being of their country.

8850

CSO: 1800

REGIONAL

TURKMEN MVD OFFICIAL ON FIREARMS REGISTRATION VIOLATIONS

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 27 Aug 80 p 4

[Turkmen MVD official responds to readers' queries: "The Sporting Gun in Reliable Hands"]

[Text] What is the procedure for registering and storing sportsmen's firearms? What measures are provided for in respect of amateur sportsmen who have not registered them in time? These and other questions from a group of our readers were answered by A.N. Zhirnova, employee of the Turkmen SSR MVD Criminal Investigation Administration.

The Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "Liability for Violation of the Rules of the Acquisition, Registration and Storage of Firearms" has been in effect for almost 4 years now. A great deal of work has been done by the state and law-enforcement authorities and voluntary organizations to regulate the sale of sporting guns and ammunition, register the guns in the possession of citizens and in establishments and organizations and to confiscate them from persons leading an antisocial way of life, suffering from various mental illnesses, without storage authorization and also failing to insure their reliable safekeeping.

The registration which we undertook amounted to more than just the purely technical aspects of drawing up storage licenses for guns. We had to perform a great deal of work on an inspection and evaluation of their technical condition and the dependability of the premises in which they were stored and a study and evaluation of the attributes of the owners themselves. More than 20,000 sporting guns have now been registered.

As was to have been expected, a large quantity of guns not in good working order and dangerous to handle was uncovered during the registration and inspection, and serious shortcomings in insuring their safekeeping were revealed. Many sporting guns were confiscated from persons systematically violating public order and the rules of communist community life and abusing liquor.

Unfortunately, there are still citizens who do not attach due significance to the requirements of the law, are declining to register guns for their personal use under a variety of pretexts and are failing to take steps to insure their safekeeping, which often leads to tragic consequences. Thus this January in Tashauz a minor who had free access to a loaded gun stored at home was handling it carelessly and fatally injured his brother. A month later in Krasnovodskiy Rayon a minor fatally injured himself under the same circumstances.

A gun kept in violation of the rules is also often used for criminal purposes. It was precisely the flagrant violation of gun-storage rules which enabled criminals to easily get into the arsenal of Ashkhabad's School No 32 and steal small-caliber rifles. The adolescents G. Atayev and A. Yeldashev stole three sporting guns from the storehouse of the "Khauzkhangidrostroy" Administration and made a sawed-off shotgun from one of them, intending to use it in the future for criminal purposes.

Officials' and citizens' observance of the rules of firearm and ammunition storage will undoubtedly enable us to avoid such instances. For this reason the Turkmen SSR MVD recommends, to avoid accidents, that persons with smooth-bore guns store them in locked cupboards and places which do not afford access to strangers, particularly children. Sporting guns should be stored in cases, unloaded and dismantled and separate from the cartridges.

The purchase of smooth-bore guns without the permission of the internal affairs authorities and without presentation of a hunting permit, their transfer to persons who do not have the right to store guns and also a refusal to register entails, in accordance with the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium decree of 21 October 1976, administrative liability in the form of a fine of up to R20 and sometimes confiscation of the guns without reimbursement of their cost.

Authorization for the storage of firearms is given for a period of 3 years. When this period expires, the guns have to be reregistered with the internal affairs authorities according to the owner's place of residence or the location of the organization, enterprise or establishment. To reregister sporting guns their owners must present to the internal affairs authorities a free statement, a hunting permit with the stamp of the sporting society denoting payment of the state tax on the right to hunt in the current year, authorization to store and bear arms and a receipt from a Gosbank establishment or savings bank for payment of the impost for reregistration of the gun.

Recently here in our country and abroad sporting societies have accumulated considerable positive experience of insuring the safekeeping of guns and ammunition. For example, in order to become a member of a sporting society in Czechoslovakia it is necessary to undergo special training in quite an extensive program (more than 50 hours), which includes study of hunting laws, the principles of hunting, the biology of game, rules of the storage and use of sporting guns and so forth. After this, the novice undergoes a year's practice in the local collective and still does not have a gun, moreover. He then takes an examination and, if he is assessed "good" or "excellent," he earns the right to a hunting permit.

There is a similar procedure in certain oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. I believe that with regard for the particular circumstances, this experience should also be introduced in our republic, the more so in the light of the corresponding departmental recommendations.

Observance of the established rules of the storage of firearms and their use is Soviet citizens' sacred duty.

8850

CSO: 1800

REGIONAL

SOVIET SCHOLARS RESEARCH POLISH-SPEAKING MINORITY IN BORDER AREAS

Warsaw NASHE SLOVO in Ukrainian 5 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] Over 1 million persons of Polish descent live in the territory of the Soviet Union. Their native language is a dialect which is known in Poland as "border Polish"--most actively used by inhabitants along the Lithuanian-Latvian-Belorussian border. The dialect is also found in certain regions of the Ukraine. To a great degree, it is similar to the language in which, for example, E. Redlins'kyy and St Belykovich composed some of their works. The language of the "borderlands" long ago aroused the wide interest of philologists and researchers from scientific institutions of the Soviet Union and Poland. Much information on the course of research on this dialect was given by Vyacheslav Verenych, doctor of philological sciences, BSSR Academy of Sciences. His discussion was published in CZERWONY SZTANDAR (a newspaper published in Polish in Vilnius) and excerpts from it were printed in the weekly PRZYJAZN, No 20. The Belorussian scholar said that, among others, an inter republic research group was formed in 1966, in which scholars from Lithuania, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Latvia, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation participated. Research was conducted over the course of 13 years in more than 70 localities of 5 republics where Poles live. The scholars' work is not only interesting, but surprising. More than 60 articles dedicated to this dialect have been published in journals (Soviet and foreign); in 1973 the 2-volume "Polish Dialects in the USSR" was published; 4 doctor's dissertations written on this theme were defended; at the Institute of Linguistics of the BSSR Academy of Sciences more than 200,000 (!) linguistic peculiarities are registered; a collection of Polish-dialect texts is being prepared for publication as well as a collection of Polish "Borderland" folksongs with music. Soviet scholars, according to Dr Verenych, together with Polish linguists have been developing mutual research measures on the above-mentioned projects. The Belorussian scholar mentioned also that in Poland since the middle of the 1950's, research has been conducted on Lithuanian and the Eastern Slavic languages; on Polish-Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian and Russian linguistic relations; and also, finally, on linguistic integration in the western and southern lands of the Polish People's Republic.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

11/10/80 Dm